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Introduction 
The South African government has, over the years, devised a complex policy to stimulate 
telecommunication infrastructures and services to develop in rural areas. By means of so-called under-
serviced area licenses (USALs), several benefits are distributed in a tender process in which small, 
black-empowered companies can participate. The regulation process showed some remarkable 
outcomes, which cannot be explained fully by the mainstream theoretical frameworks used for the 
analysis of telecommunication regulation. A striking example is the absence of clear interconnection 
guidelines, which is prescribed and to a lesser extent predicted by the status quo theories. This 
working paper aims to pinpoint the explanatory failure and introduces some new theories and 
concepts, particularly action arenas, from the field of policy science to broaden and deepen our 
analysis. We propose an adjusted conceptual framework that incorporates both the current theories, 
mainly based on the work of Levy & Spiller, and the concepts of Kiser & Ostrom. We will argue that 
in order to understand the processes in developing countries, especially when dealing with emerging 
companies, one needs a somewhat different framework than what is sufficient to understand the 
western situation. The core of our addition is twofold. First, drawing up regulation should be viewed 
as a policy game in itself. Secondly, the introduction of a constitutional choice level in our framework 
enables us to apply the rich literature on policy networks.  
The case description is based on a two-person, two-month field and desk research in South Africa. The 
analysis has been sharpened during the EAEPE 2007 conference and several discussions with Delft 
University of Technology staff. We would like to express our special gratitude towards Andrew 
Barendse, who facilitated our field work and spotted opportunities to sharpen our analysis, and Joop 
Koppenjan, who helped bridging the theoretical worlds of regulation theory and policy science. 
The first part of this paper is dedicated to current thinking in economics and its application to the case 
in South Africa. From this application it becomes apparent that an explanation gap exists. At the end 
of the paper an extension to current theories is given which would close the gap. 
 
Classical thinking 
Much has been written about regulation and the analysis of regulatory effectiveness. Levy & Spiller 
have introduced the concepts of regulatory governance and regulatory content (or incentives). They 
define governance as “(...) the mechanisms that societies use to constrain regulatory discretion and to 
resolve conflicts that arise in relation to these constraints.” (Levy & Spiller, 1994, p. 205) No formal 
definition of regulatory incentives (regulatory content) is given, but they state that it “comprises the 
rules governing utility pricing, cross- or direct subsidies, entry, interconnection, etc.” The concepts of 
Levy & Spiller are regularly used to analyse regulatory effectiveness. It is often claimed that 
regulatory governance determines regulatory content (Stern & Holder, 1999) (Berg, 2000a). As Stirton 
& Lodge (2003) put it, Levy & Spiller’s distinctive contribution is “…their analysis of how a 
country’s background pattern of legislative, judicial and administrative arrangements contributes to 
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solving the so-called ‘commitment problem’, by acting as mechanisms for restraining expropriation of 
investors by predatory governments.” (p. 2) While we lend the useful concepts of regulatory 
governance and content, we will focus on regulation in a much broader sense, as containing all 
possible regulatory incentives with a specific focus on the problem of the influence of emerging 
companies, which we will call the ‘participation problem’. 
Stern & Holder (1999) recognise that regulatory governance is in part self-determinant, but through 
actors. They operationalised regulatory governance and included participation by the actors into the 
analysis. In this paper the operationalisation of regulatory governance by Stern & Holder will be used. 
They recognised a difference between the design and the process of regulatory governance. The first 
one can be described by the clarity of roles, autonomy and accountability. The process can be 
described by participation, transparency and predictability indicators.  
Berg linked regulatory governance and content, in a web with other factors, to performance. In 
analyzing our case, we will depart from a simplified version of his conceptual framework. With regard 
to participation, Berg makes a remark that will turn out to be very important in the remainder of this 
paper: “Note that unless formal and informal processes are in alignment, transparency can be 
threatened.” (p. 16). A second important lesson from best practice regulation is “recognize that both 
communication and consultation are necessary if stakeholders are to be informed of rules and allowed 
to contribute to regulatory discussions.” (p. 17) Indeed, communication and consultation are 
recognized by the Australian Competition Commission as best practice principles of good regulation, 
together with consistency, predictability, flexibility, independence, effectiveness & efficiency, 
accountability and transparency (Berg, 2000b, p. 161). Figure 1 is a visual representation of the 
















Figure 1 Conceptual model (current understanding). 
Case description 
South Africa has a complicated history in which the infamous apartheid regime plays an important 
role. In 1994, when the apartheid was finally lifted and the ANC won the elections, a new era arrived. 
Since 1994 the ANC has focussed on empowering the black majority of people who have been held 
back by the apartheid. This ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ program touches all aspects of the 
economy, including the telecommunications market. In 2001 the Minister of Telecommunications of 
South Africa recognised that large areas of South Africa were not covered by telecommunications 
services. At that time the fixed-line penetration did not exceed 11% (11 lines per hundred inhabitants) 
and the mobile phone penetration was 17% (Telkom, 2006). The South African telecommunications 
market consisted of four companies: the incumbent fixed operator Telkom and three mobile operators 
(Vodacom, MTN and Cell-C). The Minister introduced the so-called Under-serviced Area License 
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(USAL) to increase these penetrations. This licensing scheme had two main goals. In the first place the 
goal was to encourage the offering of telecommunications services in under-serviced areas and 
secondly the goal was to economically stimulate historically disadvantaged groups by setting 
quantitative targets on the participation of people from these groups in the labour force, the 
management and the share-ownership. 
 
Actors 
Several actors are involved, next to the incumbent operators. First of all there is the Department of 
Communications (DoC). The DoC is the home of the Minister and aims on creating “…a sustainable 
and enabling Information and Communication Technology environment”. The intention is to use this 
environment for socio-economic development. The DoC designs the policy in South Africa and 
creates bills and acts. 
The regulator in South Africa is ICASA (Independent Communications Authority of South Africa). It 
is a converged regulator, which regulates both the broadcasting market as well as the 
telecommunications market. ICASA can make regulations, issue licenses, enforce compliance, decide 
on disputes and protect customers. Their main goal is to keep the telecommunications market healthy 
and promote competition, while also promoting Black Economic Empowerment. 
In South Africa there also exists a Universal Service Agency (USA), which promotes, facilitates and 
monitors the achievement of universal service and access in under-serviced areas, and also manages 
the Universal Service Fund. All telecommunications providers deposit a percentage of their annual 
turnover in this fund. The revenues can then be used to promote Universal Service and Access. The 
USA has several projects, amongst which are telecentres (centres with telecommunications facilities in 
under-serviced areas) and the subsidies to the Under-Serviced Area Licensees. 
Due to specific rules in the license (which will be described later), the Under-Serviced Area Licensees 
are all small companies. Most companies are established by (a cooperation of) local municipalities, 
who in their turn hired local entrepreneurs to govern the business. The companies have little or no 
experience in telecommunications and often have very little money available, while legal knowledge is 
limited. Therefore most sector-specific knowledge is obtained from consultants and lawyers. 
 
The USAL policy 
The first draft of the policy was published in 2001 and it was amended several times since then. The 
final policy was not completed before the first licensing round began. Early December 2004 the first 
licences were signed and the final licence conditions became clear. The licence consists of a grant, 
several restrictions and a subsidy. 
The final licence grants the licensee the right to operate a telecommunications network and provide 
telecommunications services in a designated area. The licensee can use any technology for their 
network, including fixed and mobile technologies. There can be only one licensee in every designated 
area, but national operators, including the four existing operators, are free to compete with the 
licensees. There are no rules or guidelines for interconnection, other than the fact that existing 
operators have an obligation to interconnect on request. 
The licence is technology-neutral and allows the licensee to offer wireless services, but it does not 
grant the licensee the right to use the necessary frequencies. For every frequency a separate licence is 
needed and both the Telecommunications Act and the Licence are unclear about the pricing of this 
spectrum. 
A remarkable feature of the licence conditions is the earlier mentioned Black Economic 
Empowerment. The companies bidding for a licence must be Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises 
(SMMEs). As much as 30% of the total issued voting share capital must be owned by local historically 
disadvantaged groups. Secondly, 45% of the management should consist of people from these groups. 
The licensees get a 15 million Rand (approximately 1.44 million Euros) subsidy, spread over 3 years, 
but ICASA can direct the licensee to repay this subsidy if pre-set roll-out targets are not met. The 
licensee is not allowed to use the licence to secure additional funding. 
The licence conditions should support an economically empowering SMME to compete with the four 
national operators, which all have networks in (parts of) the designated areas and deliver services in 
high-cost areas. 
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Legislative process 
While the first licences were awarded in October 2004, the licensing process started in 2002. The first 
Invitation to Apply was published then, including a draft licence. In the following years, several of the 
licence conditions have been altered or removed, extra conditions and provisions made and 
subsequently removed and markets opened to other market players. We will discuss the different 
changes that occurred during the licensing process. 
One of the most remarkable subjects concerning the licensees are the interconnection guidelines. 
During the process several intentional interconnection guidelines have been published by both the 
Ministry and ICASA. Several times there have been opportunities to respond and public hearings were 
held. Many of the proposed guidelines would have been beneficial for the Under-Serviced Area 
operators. At the end of the process, no guidelines were accepted and the USALs were left to their 
own negotiating power. It is interesting to note that at the time of writing (mid 2007) there are ‘new’ 
guidelines proposed, which are, for a major part, the same as declined guidelines published in 2004. 
Voice-over-IP (VoIP) is a reasonably new technology, which can be used to provide 
telecommunications over relatively cheap Internet Technology hardware. Before the licensing process 
started, the incumbent operator Telkom was the only party allowed to use this technology. The USALs 
were an exceptional group, as they were allowed to use this technology as soon as they got a license. 
Due to pressure from the market the Department of Communications decided to open up this market in 
October 2004, just after the first licenses were awarded. This actually meant that any party was 
allowed to offer VoIP services, robbing the USALs of their advantage. Subsequently there is now a 
new Electronic Communications Act (formerly Convergence Bill), which fully opens the 
telecommunications market to new service providers and these service providers do not have 
restrictive license conditions about Black Economic Empowerment and Universal Service obligations. 
Several more issues were changed during the licensing process, but two more are worth mentioning 
here. USALs are allowed to provide services in the area designated in their license. Many of the 
USALs provide cellular (GSM) services to their customers. It is important for the licensees that their 
clients can cross the license area’s border, without losing connection to a network. Therefore roaming 
agreements are made with national operators (MTN and Vodacom). Some national operators do not 
agree with this practice and believe that the licensees’ operations should be restricted to their own 
area. Both ICASA and the DoC have not given definitive answers to questions about this subject. It 
might happen in the future that a USAL is to appear in court for providing services outside his own 
operating area. 
As mentioned earlier the USALs are allowed to provide mobile and fixed-mobile services, for which 
they need frequency licenses. Use of these frequencies is not incorporated in the license. Both the DoC 
and ICASA have promised to deliver these frequencies but neither has given an indication of the price 
and availability of these frequencies, leaving a large uncertainty for the licensees. 
 
Application of classical thinking 
In this section, we will apply the model shown in Figure 1 to our case. 
 
Regulatory Governance 
As discussed before, regulatory governance can be split in the design and the process of governance. 
First we will discuss the design of the governance, by discussing the Clarity of Roles, the Autonomy 
and the Accountability. The design of the regulatory governance in South Africa is similar to that in 
many other countries. According to the research done by (Wallsten et al., 2004) the roles are very 
clear and minister and regulator are formally separated. 
The autonomy of ICASA is guaranteed by the ICASA Act, which establishes the powers and funding 
of ICASA. ICASA cannot work fully independently of political intervention for several reasons. 
ICASA works independent of the ministry, as its funding is appointed by Parliament. On the other side 
that also means that the Parliament might have some control over ICASA. In practice we have not 
been able to find parliamentary interventions in ICASA matters. 
In case of a dispute between ICASA and market powers, there is the possibility of arbitration 
according to the South African Arbitration Act, which causes the decisions made by the regulator to be 
challengeable. Therefore ICASA is both accountable by the Parliament and by the arbitration 
possibilities. 
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The process of regulatory governance is another aspect. Stern and Holder operationalised the process 
with the concepts of Participation, Transparency and Predictability. There is a strong coherence 
between the design and the process and therefore some overlap exists. We will now discuss these three 
aspects of the governance process. 
Participation in the regulatory process is formally described in the law. When ICASA intents to 
implement a new regulation, they have to publish the intended regulation well in advance with the 
invitation to react within a limited period of time. Any person or organisation interested in the 
intended regulation can then send a representation of his or her position towards the issue. At the end 
of the consultation period, ICASA must organise a hearing, where all parties can explain their 
viewpoint. After the hearing ICASA can implement the regulation, amended or unamended. 
The transparency of the regulatory process was not defined in the original Telecommunications Act, 
nor in the ICASA Act. Only in the new Electronic Communications Act, which has come into effect in 
2006, provisions for more transparency are included. The lack of transparency was clearly visible 
during the USAL process, for example around the interconnection guidelines. There was no reasoning 
available as to why interconnection guidelines were needed, why the published guidelines were chosen 
and afterwards there was no explanation why the guidelines were pulled back. 
The predictability of the South African telecoms regulation has been very low. The lack of 
transparency leaves room for much speculation about the future of regulation. During the USAL 
process ICASA has left several issues in the unclear and some are still not clear. Examples are the 
roaming conditions (can a USAL roam nationally on a partners network, or can they only offer 
services in their designated area?) and the interconnection guidelines, which have been published and 
recalled several times. During the writing of this paper interconnection guidelines are on the table for 
discussion, once again. 
To conclude we can state that the regulatory governance is largely up to standards. The regulatory 
governance design is as it should be, following the mainstream prescriptive theories in the field, and 
only in the process we can see some issues, which might cause malfunctioning. 
 
Regulatory Content 
The regulatory content is already described in the case description. Important elements are the 
technology-neutrality of the policy and the enforcement of Black Economic Empowerment. Other 
elements are the limitation of the possibilities of the USALs to get funding, the lack of interconnection 
guidelines, the unavailability of radio-frequency licences and the availability of new licensing 
schemes, which provide similar rights with much less restrictions. Some of these elements of the 
licence conditions have recently changed or are in the process of being changed at the time of writing. 
Important to note is that some of these elements are in conflict with generally accepted views in 
literature. For example the Telecommunications Handbook by InfoDev states that ‘there is a consensus 
that ex ante interconnection guidelines are a necessary and effective means to promoting good 
interconnection agreements.’ (Intven & Tétrault, 2000, pp. 3-18) Nonetheless the Minister and ICASA 
have decided not to use interconnection guidelines. 
To conclude, we can state that the regulatory content does not match international insights on 
developing markets and that the regulatory content might not reach the policy goals, as the newly 
created USALs are not properly supported in their struggle against the incumbents. 
 
Market Performance 
As already stated in the case description, the mobile phone penetration has risen from 17% in 2001 to 
49.5% in 2006. It can thus be stated that the primary goal of the policy, which is promoting 
telecommunications penetration, has been reached. This is however an illusion. The raise in 
penetration is fully caused by the incumbent operators. The USALs are continuously on the brink of 
bankruptcy. A report from the Universal Service Agency1 states that all USALs together currently 
have 17,000 subscriber, on average spending R20 (about 1.5 EUR) in six months. The same report 
states that ‘to achieve positive earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation in year 
three was unrealistic’. It is clear that the Black Economic Empowerment goal of the policy has failed 
and that the enormous gain in penetration is not due to the USALs. 
                                                    
1
 Referred to at http://www.iweek.co.za/ViewStory.asp?StoryID=166011, not directly available. 
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Lack of explaining power 
Even though the Regulatory Governance lives up to international standards, somehow the regulatory 
content and the market performance are not as expected. Where does this discrepancy come from? 
Theory states that if the regulatory governance is right the market performance should follow. 
Experiences in other countries have always supported this view. We believe that the regulatory 
governance as described by literature might be right for developed countries with developed markets, 
but in developing markets there is a need for more insight in the workings of the regulatory 
governance process. There is a reason for this. In developing countries skills and resources are not 
readily available. More than in developed countries, skills and resources are scarce goods. In the South 
African case the researchers have seen several cases where skills were bought away from government 
organisations by large firms. The skills and resources problem becomes even more important in South 
Africa because of the apartheid legacy. 
 
Closing the explanation gap 
In the previous section, we showed that the current models which interrelate regulatory governance 
and regulatory content and the recommendations regarding the design of and the process about the 
governance surrounding them, cannot fully explain some remarkable outcomes due to a coarse-grained 
set of concepts. Furthermore, it is unclear how we can change the status quo. One can recommend to 
some actor (the government?) to change things, but this actor can be as much a part of the problem as 
it is of the solution. We need a sharper analytical toolkit to explain why the regulatory governance is 
designed in a certain way. Only with that understanding, one can work on changing this governance. 
We think that general concepts from the policy sciences can contribute to a better understanding of the 
phenomena perceived. We will shortly discuss three authors who provide important analytical material 
for our case and indicate their contribution to ours. Only in the next section we will present an 
enriched framework which takes these new notions into account. 
Kiser and Ostrom’s Three worlds of action (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982) sketches a metatheoretical 
framework that covers the full spectrum from designing institutional arrangements to actual behaviour 
of actors. They identify three levels of action: the constitutional choice level, the collective choice 
level and the operational level. At each level, a game between actors is played. These games can be 
analysed by looking at attributes of the decision situation as well as those pertaining to the individual 
decision-makers. These dependent variables help explaining actions, activities and strategies, which in 
turn lead to certain results. One of the factors underlying the attributes of the decision-situation are the 
institutional arrangements, which Kiser and Ostrom define as “…the sets of rules governing the 
number of decision makers, allowable actions and strategies, authorized results, transformations 
internal to decision situations, and linkages among decision situations.” (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982, p. 
191) The structure of each game is recursive. The game at the operational level is ‘fed’ by the 
outcomes of the game on the collective choice level, which resulted in a determination of the 
institutional arrangements for the operational level. The same holds true for the constitutional level 
games, which result in the institutional arrangements relevant to the collective choice level. The 
concept of the three games allows us to add an additional level of analysis to the framework derived 
from the status quo perspective. The ‘constitutional’ choice level leads to rules determining the 
regulatory governance. 
 
[Figure 2 over here] 
Figure 2 Three levels of institutional analysis. Source: Kiser & Ostrom (1982, p. 207). 
 
Figure 2 shows the analytical elements at each level, which are identical due to the recursive nature of 
the model. This model can improve our understanding in two ways. First, it gives a framework for 
analysing games. By acknowledging that regulation processes are games, at different levels, we can 
open up this toolbox for a better understanding. In the example of the interconnection guidelines, we 
see that it are not only the institutional arrangements (regulatory governance) that are responsible for 
the outcomes of the collective choice level (regulatory content). Also the attributes of the community 
and individuals (actors) involved play a role. Secondly, the addition of a new layer, the constitutional 
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choice level, gives an indication as to how regulatory governance can be changed. The recognition of 
this level and the games played there opens a new theoretical window to the literature on network 
formation. Two examples of theories in that strand are Bachrach & Baratz and Klein & Koppenjan. 
Their notions can help improve our understanding of the South African situation, in our opinion. 
 
Figure 3 represents an enriched conceptual framework, which is a combination of the classical 




















typology Kiser & Ostrom
 
Figure 3 Proposed conceptual framework. 
 
 
Bachrach & Baratz (1963) describe how non-decisionmaking (“the practice of limiting the scope of 
actual decisionmaking to ‘safe’ issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and 
political institutions and procedures.”) can occur. They identify power, authority, influence and force 
as explanatory variables. The case of the interconnection guidelines can be explained by analysing the 
attributes of actors in these respects. Without making the analysing at this point, it is clear that vested 
interests played a significant role in the resistance of change (van Leijden & Monasso, 2005). 
Koppenjan & Klijn (2000) clearly outline how structural characteristics of a policy network influence 
the policy outcomes. Among other things, they focus on the possibilities of network constitution: 
changing the network itself. They mention three possible strategies to accomplish this. First, one can 
change the position of actors or introduce new actors. Furthermore, the rules of the game can be 
changed, and finally, one can reframe, “radically change ideas about the functioning and the 
substantive problems of the network” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). The authors warn governments for 
confusing different roles in a network, the roles being a hierarchical one (not participating in the 
network processes), a cooperative role, being a process manager and performing the task of building 
the network. Koppenjan & Klijn (2000, p. 145) make the very relevant remark that “Changes in the 
resource distribution in the networks are (…) reflected in the policy games.” Network change takes 
place at the constitutional choice level. At this level, we can also make use of the scientific work of 
North (especially North (1994)) and his views on the (difficulties of) institutional change. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
In this working paper, we suggested the application of theories from policy science to 
telecommunication regulation issues. The dominant conceptual framework in assessing 
telecommunication regulation has a partial mismatch with the outcomes observed, at least in our 
(single) South African case. The participation problem, small companies having the formal 
possibilities but not (being able to) use them effectively, could not be explained by mainstream 
prescriptive theories in the status quo. By adding Kiser & Ostrom’s three levels of institutional action, 
we both deepen and broaden our analytical toolkit. Notions on policy networks provide promising 
insights. 
More deliberation on these possibilities can provide fertile ground for sharper analyses, in our opinion. 
As this is a working paper, we intended to provide a direction of thought, not a completely fleshed out 
new conceptual framework. Only after a thorough consolidation of these new insights, better practical 
recommendations can be made. 
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